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Sri Lankan nationalism versus the struggle for the right to self-determination of the Tamil population

From popular contestation to militarisation of the conflict at a regional level.

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The government of Sri Lanka, led by Mahina Rajapaksee, refuses to consider a peace pact and the demands of Tamil minority community because it trusts in its military power to destroy the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, better known as the Tamil Tigers) and in its legitimacy to use this force. The ideology of singhala nationalism is underlying this attitude and behaviour. The LTTE and the Tamil community now believes that the one and only solution is a separate state named « Tamil Eelam ». Above analysis of the current conflict going on in Sri Lanka is from S. SANGARAPPILLAI. He speaks from the point of view of a Tamil origin himself.

I. Issues of contention between government of Sri Lanka and Tamil population

The Tamils find that they are discriminated by the Sinhala (Sri Lankan) Government and its acts by depriving a section of Eelam Tamils of their citizenship, declaring the Sinhala flag as the national flag, colonising parts of the Tamil homeland with Sinhala people, imposing Sinhala as the official language, discriminating against Tamil students seeking University admission, depriving Tamil language speakers of employment in the public sector, dishonouring agreements entered into with the Tamil parliamentary political leadership. Furthermore by refusing to recognise constitutional safeguards against discrimination, later removing these constitutional safeguards altogether, adopting an indigenous Constitution with a foremost place for Buddhism, and changing the name of the island itself (replacing the previous “Ceylon”) to the Sinhala Buddhist name of Sri Lanka.

Violence is not only structural but also physical. Arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, extra judicial killings, indiscriminate aerial bombardments etc. are acts that aim at oppressing the Tamil need for self-determination.

The structural discrimination of the Tamil population in Sri Lanka in public life at the political, economic, social, cultural, and educational level leads them to believe that the one and only solution is a separate state for tamils within Sri Lanka (or called Ceylon by some).

In order to understand the current conflict in Sri Lanka we need to look at its historical roots, which lie in the colonial period.

II. Historic roots of the conflict

The dawn of the 17th century saw the ships of the seafaring nations of Europe appear in the Indian Ocean. They were attracted to the island by the cinnamon trade of Ceylon. They found a prosperous Tamil Kingdom in the north and east of Ceylon, which had existed for more than five centuries. According to Professor G. C. Mendis, a Singhalese historian, « it survived the conquests of the Pandya, the Singhalese and the Vijayanagara rulers, and came to an end only in 1621 when it was conquered by the Portuguese. The same invasion compelled the Singhalese to move southwards leaving the ancient centres of Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa as no man’s land ».

In the western maritime part of Ceylon, which is now the Western and Southern Provinces, the Portuguese found a Singhalese Kingdom with a king having his seat of government at Jayawardenepura Kotte. This city had been founded by a Tamil Viceroy, named Alakeswara, of the Singhalese King who ruled from Gampola, to defend the kingdom against the Tamil King of the Jaffna Kingdom, whose navy had laid siege. Alakeswara later became the Singhalese King by the name of Alagakonara who ruled over the western maritime part, which came to be known as the Kotte Kingdom. It is to this city of Jayawardenepura Kotte that the Government of late President Jayawardene shifted the Capital and Parliament of Ceylon. The Portuguese also conquered the Kotte Kingdom. Portuguese rule, over the conquered territories of the Jaffna and Kotte Kingdoms was short lived. The Dutch conquered them from the Portuguese and established their rule until the close of the 18th century when the British ousted the Dutch. In 1802, by the Treaty of the Amiens, these territories were ceded to the British Crown.

Prior to 1947, under the British Donoughmore Constitution, the civil administration of internal affairs of the country was in the hands of a Board of ministers formed from the elected members. This Board of Ministers was headed by Mr.D.S. Senanayake, but it was subject to checks by three British Secretaries. With the imminence of India’s independence in the air, Mr. D. S. Senanayake chose an opportune moment to communicate with Whitehall and raised the question of Ceylon’s independence. Whitehall requested the Board of Ministers to submit a constitutional scheme, which would be examined and reported on by a Royal Commission to be appointed at the end of the War. The Board of Ministers, composed preponderantly of Singhalese Ministers, submitted a scheme modelled on the British system of Cabinet Government and insisted on its total acceptance without any commission having to examine it. It is widely believed that this draft scheme was the handiwork of Sir Ivor Jennings, the then Principal of the Ceylon University College.

When the War came to an end Whitehall, nevertheless, appointed a Royal Commission under the chairmanship of Viscount Soulbury with terms of reference to study the constitutional scheme of the Board of Ministers, hear evidence in Ceylon, if necessary, and to recommend proposals for the reform of the constitution. Although Mr. D. S. Senanayake and his ministerial colleagues officially and formally boycotted the Commission, privately they had long and protracted negotiations with the Commission in Colombo.

The Soulbury Commission visited during 1944-45 and held public sittings in the principal cities of the island. All the important minority communities made representations through their organisations. An ad-hoc body of Tamil leaders under the leadership of Mr. G. G, Ponnambalam made the representation before the Commission on behalf of the Ceylon Tamils. Mr. G. G. Ponnambalam presented the case as its sole spokesman. He enunciated the fifty-fifty formula formula for parliamentary representation, which represented the consensus that had been reached among all the Tamil leaders of the time. The fifty-fifty formula simply meant that fifty percent of the seats in the legislature to be established under the reformed constitution should be allotted to the Singhalese by virtue of their being the majority people, while all the other minority communities put together should be given the remaining fifty- percent. The Soulbury Commission paid a polite tribute to Mr. G. G. Ponnambalam’s performance, but rejected the formula. It made its recommendations accepting the scheme of the Board of Ministers in its totality. Then what was the need for a Royal Commission? The most plausible answer Mr. V. Navaratnam (a former Tamil parliamentarian) gave in his book was that, Whitehall was aware of the existence of a Tamil-Singhalese conflict in Ceylon and the Board of Ministers’ scheme was a completely Singhalese proposal, and that the British did not wish to appear as having not consulted the Tamils and other minorities. British’s solution to the Ceylon’s problem, which is an almost identical conflict in India, the Hindu-Muslim problem, was different from what they did in India. In India the British were in favour of the minority and separated Pakistan from India. In Ceylon the British acted in favour of the majority and gave the majority what they wanted, ignoring the future of the minorities.

III. Popular contestation by the Tamil minority 1956-1983

Below we will discuss the period from 1956 to 1983 because the conflict conditions in this period are still decisive for the current situation. The first Tamil demonstrations and non violent protests were started in 1956, followed by the communal riots and they continued until 1983, when the armed militant groups launched the campaign for solution by arms for a separate state. The lack of success of the non violent protests has led to the militarisation of the struggle.

Conflict Timeline 1956-1983

• Denial of language rights (1956)

• State-aided Sinhala colonisation in the East, beginning with Gal Oya

• Attempt to bring Tamils into submission by the State permitting, and conniving at, and later actively promoting mob attacks on them (1956, 1958, 1961, 1977, 1981, 1983);

• Using the police and army to put down even the passive resistance employed by the Tamils in North and East during the Federal Party’s Satyagraha campaign in 1961;

• Destroying the cultural wealth of the Tamils in Jaffna by using Sinhala hoodlums to burn down the Public Library, bookshops in the town and Jaffna’s only Tamil newspaper, the Eelanadu (1981);

• Adopting intimidating legislation such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act (1979) later made part of the permanent law of the land (1982) and used since then exclusively on the Tamil people;

• Destruction of Hindu temples in the south (1977) and later in other parts of the island;

• Enthroning Buddhism with special status in 1972 constitution, a constitution that was adopted without Tamil consent, and against Tamil opposition.

Amidst the fast growing insecurity for the Tamils, the Tamil political leadership formed the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) in 1976, and at its inaugural convention, presided over by Chelvanayakam resolved to restore and reconstitute the state of Tamil Eelam. Their resolution stated: « The first National Convention of the Tamil Liberation Front, meeting at Pannakam (Vaddukodai constituency), hereby declares that the Tamils of Ceylon, by virtue of their great language, their religions, their separate culture and heritage, their history of independent existence as a separate state over a distinct territory for several centuries until they were conquered by the armed might of the European invaders and above all by their will to exist as a separate entity ruling themselves in their own territory, are a nation distinct and apart from the Sinhalese and their constitution announces to the world that the Republican constitution of 1972 has made the Tamils a slave nation ruled by the new colonial masters, the Sinhalese, who are using the power they have wrongly usurped to deprive the Tamil nation of its territory, language, citizenship, economic life, opportunities of employment and education and thereby destroying all the attributes of nationhood of the Tamil people. And therefore… this Convention resolves that the restoration and reconstitution of the free, sovereign, secular, socialist State of Tamil Eelam based on the right of self-determination inherent in every nation has become inevitable in order to safeguard the very existence of the Tamil nation in this country."

Tamil requests center around:

• The recognition of the Tamils of Sri Lanka as a nation;

• The recognition of the existence of an identified homeland for the Tamils in Sri Lanka;

• The recognition of the right of self determination of the Tamil nation;

• The recognition of the right to citizenship and the fundamental rights of all Tamils who look upon the island as their country.

The physical and structural discrimination of the Tamil population in Sri Lanka in public life at the political, economic, social, cultural, and educational level leads them to believe that the one and only solution is a separate state for tamils within Sri Lanka (or referred to as Ceylon by those not accepting its name).

IV. Militarisation of the conflict from 1983

The violence against innocent and unarmed Tamils in July 1983 brought in its wake many unintended and unforeseen consequences. Chief among them, was the rise of the Tamil armed militancy. Those responsible for the anti-Tamil pogrom and the Sixth Constitutional Amendment disavowing separatism may have expected the Tamil people to be cowed into submission through brute force. It was the opposite that happened. The Tamil Eelam cause and related armed struggle received massive support.

The phenomenon of young Tamils outraged by the 1983 July violence chanting the mantra of « aayuthap porattam » (armed struggle) received two terrific boosts:

• Firstly, India entered the scene and began providing arms and training to the new recruits. Boatload after boatload of youths crossed the Palk Strait and received training in North and South India.

• Then there was a massive exodus of Tamils to foreign countries. The Tamil diaspora grew rapidly in size. These Tamils began collecting and sending money to the armed movements. Thus began growing the Tamil armed struggle.

The Tamil armed resistance groups named as LTTE, PLOTE, TELO, EPRLF and EROS together had only about 275 to 300 cadres when the July violence erupted. The numbers began swelling in the aftermath of the pogrom. The combined strength of the groups reached five digits within a year. This rapid increase caused its own problems. Later fratricidal conflicts transformed the nature of the Tamil armed struggle. Nevertheless there is no denying that the 1983 violence effectively laid the foundation for a widespread conflict that is yet to be resolved.

V. Prospects for Peace, an evaluation of the failed peace negotiation in 2000:

There have been numerous attempts at the resolution of conflict. We will discuss there the most recent one of 2000 and which took place as a result of a Norvegian initiative to mediate.

InDecember 2000, the LTTE declared a unilateral ceasefire. Four months of negotiations toward a mutual ceasefire with the President’s PA government came to nought. In July, 2001 the LTTE attacked the Katunayake Airport, but followed this up with a second unilateral ceasefire. In late 2001, Ranil Wickremesinghe’s UNF government won the parliamentary election and in February, 2002, the government of Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe signed a cease-fire agreement with the LTTE. This, in turn, led to the beginning of the Peace Talks between the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE in Thailand in September of 2002.

The 2002 Oslo statement stressed the exploration of alternatives to separation for the island of Sri Lanka. An alternative is considered necessary to correct the current ineffective representation of Tamils in a central parliament under a Unitary Constitution, in which Parliament the Tamils are a permanent minority, totally outnumbered by the Sinhalese majority in the South. It also recognized the fact that the Tamils were the regional majority in the North East, despite Sinhalese government efforts to change the demography of the region. Armed Sinhalese ex-convicts, among others, were given free land and support to farm lands in the Tamil-dominated North Eastern Province. The Tamils and Tamil-speaking Muslims of the region were excluded from receiving these grants of land in their own territory.

In Oslo several countries pledged 70 million dollars to help the North East of the island to return to a state of « normalcy », with particular emphasis on having refugees return to their homes. This money, which was to be administered by the World Bank, yet remains untouched, based on bureaucratic obstruction by the government and the action of its armed forces, who were instructed to bar refugees from being repatriated to their homes in what have been classified by the government as ‘high security zones.’

In April, 2003, the LTTE pulled out of the Peace Talks because of the government’s inaction in regard to the resettlement of refugees, their failure to dismantle their high security zones and their failure to treat the LTTE as equal partners in the negotiations. In that same year, the Tokyo Conference donors pledged 4.5 billion dollars for reconstruction and development, subject to satisfactory progress of the Peace Talks.

Frustrated by the government’s obstruction preventing a return to normalcy in the North-East led the LTTE to submit their Interim Self governing Authority (ISGA) (proposal on October 31, 2003). Mr Wickremesinghe’s UNF government was ready to continue the Peace Talks using these proposals as the basis for discussion. The President Bandaranayake Kumarathunge virulently opposed this stance taken by the government in power and proceeded to remove three key government ministers - Defense, Media and Interior - in 2004. Her action put an immediate end to the Talks. She then dissolved Parliament in February, 2004.

The current President Mahinda Rajapakse and his communist coalition partner, the JVP, who bitterly opposed the Interim Self governing Authority proposals, were determined to resist the granting of any meaningful powers to the Tamils in their desire to preserve the status quo of Sri Lanka as a Sinhalese Buddhist State, to whom all other ethnic groups would be eternally subordinate. Consequently, when the LTTE presented the Interim Self Governing Authority [ISGA) proposals as a basis upon which the Peace Talks were to continue, as stated earlier, the President first fired three crucial Ministers of the UNF government, one of whom was spearheading the talks. Not satisfied with that, she then dissolved the Parliament and ordered a new election, which promptly ended the Peace Talks.

At that election, all the major Tamil parties unanimously supported the Tamil stance and its effort to continue with the Peace Talks based on the ISGA proposals. The proposals are consistent with the concept of having a Federal State as an alternative to separation, as envisaged by the Oslo statement in 2003. The former Prime Minister and present Leader of the Opposition also support this position.

The President finally agreed, despite her initial opposition, to continue with the Peace Talks based on the ISGA proposals. Her communist coalition partner the JVP opposed this agreement, as did the party of extremist Buddhist monks, both of whom want to preserve a Sinhalese Buddhist State. The President, in an effort to placate the International community, who insisted at the Tokyo Conference that aid would only be forthcoming if the peace talks were continued, reiterated that she was ready to continue with the talks with the ISGA as the base. However, in a further effort to retain her coalition partner, the JVP, the President suggested that she would make counter-proposals before the talks were to continue. Counter-proposals could be discussed at the Talks, rather than made a pre-condition for the talks to continue. The ISGA were proposals for an interim regional government, the details of which could be modified at the talks.

The Government has violated the cease-fire agreement by fueling the efforts of Karuna’s supporters and other LTTE opponents to destabilize the LTTE and by encouraging the Sri Lankan Army to refuse to abide by its terms. The armed forces have refused to vacate schools and other buildings used by civilians in the region, they have denied refugees the right to return to their homes and they continue to disrupt farming, fishing and other economic activities.

The Government has entered into an Arms Agreements with India in an effort to prepare for further war rather than to pursue peace. The Sri Lankan government announced its withdrawal from the ceasefire agreement on January 2, 2008, hours after a bomb attack on an army bus in the capital, Colombo, killed one soldier and three civilians, and wounded 28 others, mostly civilians.

VI. Current perspectives for peace?

The government justifies its current military offensive in LTTE-held areas as necessary to eliminate a clear and present threat to pluralist, democratic politics in Sri Lanka.

Sri Lankan forces are closing in on territory controlled by Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Kilinochi, current political capital of the rebels, could fall in the hands of government. But almost all the political parties in Indian state of Tamil Nadu have come together in demanding immediate halt to New Delhi’s covert support to the military action against ethnic Tamils. With a current level of militarisation it is hard to see perspectives of peace coming from within the country, a possibility to end the ongoing war would be by the pressure of the Indian government or an eventual military intervention in Sri lanka, which could lead to summon both conflicting parties into peace process.